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Abstract 
Much of the academic and policy literature on performance related pay (PRP) focuses 
on its role as an incentive system. Its role as means for renegotiating performance 
norms has been largely neglected. The study examines the introduction of 
performance related pay, based mostly on appraisals by line managers, in the British 
public services during the 1990s. Previous research indicates PRP failed to motivate 
many of the staff and its operation had been divisive. Nevertheless, other information 
suggests that productivity rose. This article seeks to resolve the paradox using contract 
theory to show that performance pay was the instrument of a major renegotiation of 
performance norms, and that this rather than motivation has been the key story. Goal 
setting and appraisal by line managers played a key role in this process. 
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The role of performance related pay in renegotiating the ‘effort bargain’: the 
case of the British public service.
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There is a paradox to be explained concerning the spread of performance related pay 
(PRP) in the British public services. In the public policy debate it has been common to 
associate its introduction with the aim of improving incentives and motivation among 
public employees (Brown and Heywood, 2002). This has been a key element in 
government and top management thinking in the British public services, echoed in 
two recent government reports (Bichard, 1999, Makinson, 2000), and it has been a 
long-standing interest in the work of the OECD’s public management reform program 
(Maguire, 1993, OECD 2002). It is also a recurrent theme in much of the Personnel 
Economics and Human Resource Management literature (eg. Lazear 1998, Milkovich 
and Wigdor 1991, Mitchell et al. 1990, Armstrong and Murlis, 1994). From the late 
1980s, the British public services embarked upon the most systematic and sustained 
policy of extending and developing performance related pay of any OECD country, 
mostly replacing annual seniority-related pay increments with performance-related 
ones based on goal setting and appraisals by line-managers, sometimes called 
‘appraisal-related pay’ (ACAS, 1990). Nevertheless, when surveying both academic 
research findings and inside management information, the government’s Makinson 
report concluded that performance pay had not motivated public employees in Britain, 
and its operation had been divisive (Makinson, 2000). Given that the policy has been 
sustained by three successive prime ministers of quite different political persuasion, 
two Conservative and one Labor, as well as successive top managers, it is hard to 
believe its continued use can be explained by political dogma. Likewise, in the face of 
such evidence, the perseverance of top public management and of successive 
governments is hard to understand if employee motivation is the main story. We need 
to look elsewhere for an explanation. 
 
In this article, I argue that the alternative explanation can be found in the use of 
performance pay, and of performance management more widely, to provide a 
framework for renegotiating performance standards with public employees: to 
renegotiate the ‘effort bargain’. This is consistent with rising organizational 
performance, which would explain top management’s perseverance, and with the 
repeated evidence that PRP has failed to motivate many public employees.  A couple 
of examples from the fieldwork that accompanied the survey data, which are analyzed 
later, illustrate the kind of changes management has sought to introduce with the aid 
of PRP. In one of the hospitals, management wanted to move away from covering 
extended working after normal hours and at weekends by means of overtime and 
weekend premium payments. It wanted a more flexible system that would provide 
cover in a more patient-centered way on which management could draw as extra time 
was needed. In exchange, it would reward cooperative behavior with a higher basic 
salary and performance pay. In the tax service, management wanted employees to 
change from a focus on working to predetermined standards dictated by their job 
classifications to one of individual performance. This, it believed, would be more 
responsive to the demands from individual tax-payers, and more relevant to the 
differences in ability between individual employees in similar jobs. In both examples, 
there is a degree of working ‘smarter’, but also a significant element of working more 
intensively when the patient’s or the tax-payer’s needs required. In doing so, public 
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employees also become more exposed to the uncertain timing  of citizens’ demands, 
and have less control over their pace and manner of work. Even where such changes 
are agreed with unions, management has still to make the deal stick on the shop and 
office floor. Line-managers are the strategic link in the chain translating the abstract 
objectives of change into the everyday tasks that individual public servants undertake: 
hence the importance of goal-setting and appraisal. But they are also potentially a 
weak link as they come under pressure from their staff to be lenient with work 
assignments and over-generous with performance rewards. The widely observed 
upward ‘drift’ in performance appraisal and pay awards stems from just such 
pressures (eg. Milkovich and Wigdor, 1991).  
 
In both examples, one can see that incentive and goal-setting features of performance 
pay still play a key part in the story, but motivation is only their secondary function. 
Their primary function, through appraisal and goal-setting, I argue, has been to enable 
management to redefine the established performance norms in their organization, and 
then to operate them effectively, with the explicit or tacit agreement of as many 
employees as possible. 
Performance management as a means of renegotiation: main theories 
It has been common to analyze the workings of PRP in recent years through the lens 
of three main theories: agency, expectancy, and goal setting theory. These shed a 
great deal of light on the static incentive and appraisal processes present in PRP. They 
have focused mainly on how management can influence employees’ choice between 
different levels of effort or care in their work. To understand the changes occurring in 
the British public services, one needs to complement this with a more dynamic 
analysis of inducements for employees to agree the new set of performance norms, 
and work within these. 
 
The idea of renegotiation is most simply explained in terms of contract theory. A 
worker and a firm agree the terms of their exchange when the worker is hired. A key 
feature of the employment contract is that it should be open-ended in terms of both its 
duration and its content. Workers agree to give the employer’s agent, management, 
some flexibility to adapt that content to changing demands, but only within certain 
limits (Coase, 1937). From time to time, it becomes necessary to revise these limits. 
This becomes an occasion for renegotiation. This time, however, each party has made 
investments in the relationship and is vulnerable to pressure tactics from the other. 
Much of the contract literature emphasizes pay because of changes in the market 
valuation of employee output (Malcomson, 1997). Less visible, but just as important 
for management, is the ability to revise job boundaries, and redefine the nature and 
standards of performance that it requires from employees. These are usually the 
subject of a tacit understanding between staff and management, sometimes called the 
‘effort bargain’, except that it encompasses qualitative as well as quantitative aspects 
of performance. 
 
By what processes does renegotiation come about? Much of the recent literature has 
focused on the role of collective bargaining, as did Teulings and Hartog (1998), but 
their main interest lay in pay adjustments. Pay rules are generally codified by virtue of 
their inclusion in collective agreements and individual contracts of employment. In 
contrast, many of the rules relating to workers’ job boundaries and performance 
standards contain a large uncodified element. It is common for jobs to deviate 
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considerably from their formal job descriptions, and for their contents to be highly 
‘idiosyncratic’, to use Williamson’s (1975) term. They are therefore accessible to 
higher management only through the eyes of their first-line managers. To renegotiate 
performance, management needs to get right down to the level of individual jobs, and 
to the relationship between individual employees and their line-managers. Collective 
agreements often set the overall framework, but ultimately, this kind of negotiation 
has to occur between line managers and individuals or small groups of employees in 
the same office or hospital ward. 
 
At the time of hiring, workers who do not like the supervisory practices and incentive 
systems the employer offers can just walk away, so there is a process of self-selection 
that matches these to workers’ preferences. 2 However, when the time comes for 
changing work practices and incentive systems in an established organization, the 
employer faces an incumbent workforce whose preferences for or against the new 
system may vary considerably. In the change, some will expect to be winners, and 
others, losers. To get everyone to engage positively in the new system, management 
would have to offer a very attractive, and costly, deal. It might therefore prefer to 
make the new deal attractive to a sufficient proportion of its staff so that the scheme 
functions tolerably well, and to forego the support of the remaining staff in order to 
keep within some budgetary limit. Indeed, the two hospitals in the data set used in this 
article took just that path. They gave incumbent employees a choice, and so did not 
have to buy out those who were most strongly attached to the old system. Thus, one 
may consider management as operating with some kind of ‘median voter’ model, 
albeit probably based on some other proportion, whereby it designs the incentives so 
as to attract a sufficient number of its employees to make the new scheme effective, 
subject to an overall budget constraint. Thus, from an empirical point of view, the 
renegotiation perspective leads us to expect some employees to find the scheme 
positively motivating, and their performance will improve. Others may not do so, and 
may not feel adequately compensated, but the degree to which their performance will 
decline may not be equal and opposite. Because renegotiation takes place within an 
existing employment relationship, both parties weigh the benefits of accepting the 
new system against the cost of finding an alternative. Hence one expects to find a 
number of employees who do not like the new system, but nevertheless choose to 
work within it because it is not worth their while to change jobs, and they do not wish 
to be dismissed. Provided performance of the discontented does not fall too much, the 
organization may still benefit from the increased performance of those who engage 
positively. 
 
In this reading, incentive and renegotiation can be complementary functions of PRP, 
and one can say that the incentive and, particularly the goal-setting, mechanisms have 
to be working properly for PRP to be an effective means of changing work norms. 
Agency theory also guides us about the static functions of PRP. It explains how the 
role of performance and output incentives encourage employees to work hard (and not 
to ‘shirk’) when management find it costly to monitor their effort closely. It proposes 
that management can respond by tying pay to output so as to induce employees to 
choose a higher level of effort (Lazear 1995, Ch. 2), and it can also invest in better 
systems of work design and performance evaluation to improve the correlation 
between performance measures and effort, and thus strengthen incentive effects 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 226). It also warns against the dysfunctions of 
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inappropriate incentives, for example, that individual incentives may discourage 
cooperation among colleagues (Drago and Garvey, 1998)
3
. 
 
Expectancy theory, associated for example with Vroom (1964), Porter and Lawler 
(1968), Lawler (1971, Ch. 6), and Furnham (1997), like agency theory, treats 
employees as having a degree of choice and places a strong emphasis on the 
motivational effects of incentives, and the problems posed by poorly defined targets. 
Simplifying somewhat, it identifies a potentially virtuous circle. Employees will 
respond to the incentive or reward on offer if they value it (its valence), if they believe 
good performance will be instrumental in bringing the desired reward 
(instrumentality), and if they expect their efforts will achieve the desired performance 
(expectancy). The circle of Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy can be broken at a 
number of points. Employees may feel they lack scope to increase their effort, or that 
their effort will make little difference to their performance, such as might arise if they 
are given inappropriate work targets by management. This undermines expectancy. 
They may believe that management lacks the competence or the good faith to evaluate 
and reward their performance fairly, which undermines instrumentality, and may 
cause employees to view the schemes as unfair and divisive. Applied to renegotiation, 
one can see that employees are more likely to buy into a new incentive scheme when 
they perceive it to be operating fairly and able to deliver the promised rewards. 
 
Goal setting theory places less emphasis on rewards and stresses the motivating power 
of defining appropriate work goals and engaging employee commitment to them 
(Locke and Latham 1990, Latham and Lee, 1986, Brown and Latham, 2000). Of 
special relevance in the current context, is the emphasis on dialogue between line-
managers and employees to exchange information about realistic goals, and on 
agreeing to goals so that employees adopt them as their own. This framework already 
contains the germs of a negotiation process between employees and their managers, 
and so it is easy to see how the basic idea can be applied in the context of 
renegotiating performance norms. Goal setting may be especially important for the 
employees who do not like the new system, but still prefer not to change jobs. In such 
cases, it provides management with a channel to clarify the new standards and 
establish agreed levels of compliance. 
 
Thus, although the three approaches differ in emphasis, they point to the same key 
processes and variables for the analysis of performance pay systems: reward and 
motivation on the one hand, and goal definition and evaluation on the other. Although 
much of the literature has stressed a static sense of motivation and incentive for given 
sets of performance norms, it is clear that a certain level of motivational effectiveness 
is required from PRP if it is to serve as a basis for the dynamic process of 
renegotiating performance norms. Thus, in terms of empirical observation, there is a 
great deal of overlap in the variables to be tracked for both types of analysis. The 
main difference in terms of outcomes is that the renegotiation perspective predicts that 
an organization can expect improved performance from PRP even though large 
numbers of employees claim not to be motivated by it, whereas the motivational 
perspective would cause one to expect the widespread ‘disenchantment’ of the kind 
Makinson (2000) noted to lead to disappointing performance. 
 
These considerations can be expressed informally in a simple model. The incentive 
that employees perceive from a PRP scheme (perceived incentive) will be a function 
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of the additional financial reward associated with good performance, the quality and 
effectiveness of the goal-setting and appraisal process, and the scope for employees to 
improve their performance. This is summarized in Equation (1). Conversely, when 
these processes function badly, one can expect employees to experience PRP as 
divisive and demotivating (Equation (2)). Finally, if the goal setting process is 
enabling management to communicate new performance standards and make them 
stick, then it should have a direct effect on employee performance. The more 
renegotiation contributes to improved performance, the stronger one would expect to 
be the direct effect of the goal-setting and appraisal process on performance compared 
with the that pass through motivational changes (Equation 3). 
 
 
(1) Perceived incentive = f (extra financial reward, appraisal quality, clear targets, 
scope for employees to boost performance, control variables) 
 
(2) Perceived divisiveness = f (extra financial reward, appraisal quality, clear 
targets, scope for employees to boost performance, control variables) 
 
(3) Performance level = f (perceived incentive, perceived divisiveness, appraisal 
quality, interactions, control variables) 
 
 
Data and descriptive evidence on motivation and divisiveness of performance 
pay 
The analysis in this article reworks the data collected by LSE’s Center for Economic 
Performance in a series of attitude surveys across a range of public services on 
employee and line-manager judgments as to the effects of performance pay (see, 
Marsden and Richardson, 1992, and 1994, and Marsden and French, 1998). 
 
Summary evidence on employee responses to PRP and their disenchantment with it is 
summarized in Table 1, based on the employee replies to the CEP attitude surveys. 
These relate to six areas of public service work: the Inland Revenue in 1991 and 1996 
(tax service); the Employment Service (job placement and benefit payments); two 
National Health Service trust hospitals; and head teachers in primary and secondary 
schools (elementary and high schools). These were chosen to represent a cross-section 
of public organizations using performance pay at the time. Methodological details are 
summarized in the appendix. In brief, postal questionnaires asked about employee and 
line manager personal experiences with the operation of their performance pay and 
appraisal scheme in their service, their views as to whether it provided them with an 
incentive to perform in specific ways, whether their jobs gave them scope to do so, 
their judgments as to how management operated their scheme, and some biographical 
data. Many of the motivational questions were modeled on expectancy theory. In 
some cases, management gave their support and it was possible to survey a sample of 
all employees covered by the scheme in their organization. In others, management 
refused access for the survey work, although they did provide other information, and 
the unions provided a sample frame based on their membership lists. They all had 
high membership rates
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. In the organizations where management cooperated, both 
union members and non-members were included in the sample, and it appeared that 
membership had no great influence on replies. Line managers were also included in 
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the sample, and their replies could be linked to those of other employees by their 
place of work. 
 
The CEP evidence of employee disenchantment with PRP shown in Table 1 is broadly 
consistent with the results of other attitudinal surveys that applied the same 
methodology as that used by Marsden and Richardson (1992), notably, Thompson 
(1993), Kessler and Purcell (1993), Heery (1998), IRS (1999), and in the private 
sector, Carroll (1993). Despite broad support for the principle of linking pay to 
performance, only a small percentage of employees thought their existing 
performance pay schemes provided them with an incentive to work beyond job 
requirements or to take more initiative. Of even more concern to top public 
management, was the evidence that the performance pay schemes in place were seen 
by staff to be divisive and to undermine cooperation among staff, and a worrying 
percentage of line managers reported that the schemes had made staff less willing to 
cooperate with management. Note, however, the substantial minority of line managers 
who reported that PRP had caused many of the staff to work harder. 
 
These negative staff reactions cannot be explained by a naïve design of the schemes, 
summarized in the methods appendix (Table A-1). With the possible exception of the 
scheme in force in the tax service in 1991, which was one of the first in operation, all 
of the schemes obeyed the existing canons of good HR practice (as set out for 
example by ACAS 1990, and Armstrong and Murlis 1994) and had been developed 
with substantial inputs from private sector expertise. They were seriously thought-out 
schemes. With the knowledge that ratings often drift upwards, and that their 
application can be discriminatory, all the schemes incorporated substantial review 
mechanisms, and shared information with the relevant unions on the distribution of 
ratings across different categories of staff and workplaces. Reflecting the degree of 
task complexity in many public service jobs, all the individual schemes involved 
performance appraisals by line-managers based on a mixture of judgment and 
recorded data. Written records were kept of appraisals. Nor was the financial 
incentive negligible. Up to the top of the pay scale for a person’s grade, PRP replaced 
annual salary increments, and was consolidated into basic pay, and several years’ of 
good performance could lead to substantially faster pay progression. For those who 
would previously have ‘topped out’ at the maximum for their grade, PRP brought the 
opportunity of non-consolidated annual bonuses in some organizations, and of further 
progression in others. 
 
 
Table 1. Replies to employee attitude surveys in selected public service 
organizations. 
 
Measurement of key variables 
The analysis uses three outcome variables, two motivational ones built up from 
subjective responses to questions shown in Table 1, and a third based on objective 
information, appraisal scores, that could be checked against archival data. The survey 
questions relating to ‘perceived incentive’ in Table 1 were chosen to represent aspects 
of the three incentive theories. The first two questions capture the perceived disutility 
or cost to the employee of effort required to gain the reward: willingness to work 
beyond job requirements, and to take more initiative in order to get PRP. The one 
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entails more effort; the other, more risk of failure. The third question captures the 
element of perceived reward for good work as opposed to ‘shirking’. This measure of 
perceived incentive is close to that of valence of rewards in expectancy theory: are the 
rewards sufficiently valued to warrant the extra effort? 
 
The downside, ‘perceived divisiveness’, is explored by three questions chosen to 
capture the disutility of poorer work relations, and also that of diminished cooperation 
that may jeopardize the achievement of work targets. If staff are less willing to help 
their colleagues, the risk of failure to achieve targets is individualized, and the safety 
net of helping hands is removed. Likewise, should the pay system cause jealousies 
among staff. Reduced willingness to cooperate with management captures the vertical 
as opposed to the horizontal aspects of cooperation among work colleagues. The 
indices of perceived incentive and divisiveness were computed simultaneously using 
factor analysis based on these questions. 
 
For the third outcome variable, employees reported their latest appraisal score before 
the survey date. It is likely that they remembered these accurately because they 
affected their pay directly. The distributions of appraisal scores by occupational and 
demographic variables in the sample surveys were compared with archival data 
obtained from the organizations. These indicate that, by and large, respondents 
reported them accurately, and there were no obvious response biases by appraisal 
scores. Because performance was graded differently across the organizations, 
outcomes were classified into a binary scale of ‘superior’ and ‘acceptable’, the latter 
including both satisfactory and the very small number of unsatisfactory ratings. 
 
The key independent variable, the quality of the appraisal process (‘appraisal 
quality’), plays a central part in both agency and expectancy theory. This is built up 
from three questions: does an employee know what she needs to do to get a good 
appraisal; is she able to do it; and does she understand her last appraisal rating. These 
questions were validated against a larger and more concrete set of descriptive 
questions about the appraisal process used in one of the study’s hospitals, and which 
were very unlikely to be colored by whether or not the employee got a good rating
5
. 
For clarity of target setting in PRP just one question could be matched across the 
organizations: did PRP lead managers to set targets more clearly. This was 
supplemented by a question to line managers in the same office on the scope 
employees have to raise their performance. 
 
The strength of financial incentives could not be measured directly because good 
appraisals trigger performance pay, and this study uses appraisal scores as a measure 
of employee performance. However, its presence can be assessed indirectly in two 
ways. On the one hand, those on the top of the pay scale for their grade get one-off 
bonuses instead of an increase in their basic salary. One would expect such employees 
to feel less incentive than the others. On the other, those who were both of long 
service and on their grade maximum would remember the former pay system of about 
3-4 years before, with its ceilings on pay whereas those more recently recruited would 
not. Thus, an additional measure of the presence of financial incentive from PRP can 
be found by interacting employees’ being on their grade maximum with their length 
of service. 
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Affective commitment, as measured by Meyer and Allen (1997), provides an indirect 
proxy for ‘shirking’ behavior, which is otherwise difficult to explore in a 
questionnaire survey to the individuals concerned. Individual shirking is bad for the 
employer and usually bad also for one’s work colleagues as it usually disrupts their 
work and adds to their workload. In contrast, commitment, and especially affective 
commitment, implies a degree of emotional identification with one’s workplace, and 
one’s work colleagues. It was included because it was thought that commitment might 
be strong among public employees, many of whom have quite long service. In the 
regression, commitment enhanced the perceived incentive of PRP and reduced its 
perceived divisiveness. 
 
A number of organizational and demographic controls were used. Organization 
dummies are used to control for fixed effects arising from differences between the 
schemes operating in each organization, the most notable being variations in the share 
of employees getting ‘superior’ ratings owing to differences in the design of their 
schemes. Occupational controls were used, comparing each occupational group to 
managers, the one occupation that could be clearly identified across all the 
organizations. ‘Occupation’ captures many possible effects, but one notable one is 
that the clerical and service occupations generally have less control over the detail of 
their work than do managers, and professionals, and hence less scope to respond to 
performance pay incentives. On the other hand, the simpler nature of their tasks may 
make their performance easier to evaluate. Length of service and gender were also 
used. 
 
Regression results 1: perceive incentive and divisiveness 
 
Table 2. Determinants of perceived incentive and divisiveness 
 
The regression results shown in Table 2 relate to equations (1) and (2) above, and 
show that having an effective appraisal increased employees’ perceived incentive and 
reduced perceptions of divisiveness. The measures of perceived incentive and 
divisiveness, as well as that of appraisal quality, were all based on factor analysis, and 
so have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity. The standardized 
coefficients imply therefore that a doubling in the measure of appraisal quality will 
lead to change of +17% and of –19%, respectively, in measures of perceived incentive 
and perceived divisiveness. Likewise, employee judgments that PRP has led line 
managers to set targets more clearly boosts perceived incentive and reduces perceived 
divisiveness, although the way the variable was measured makes the coefficients hard 
to compare with those on appraisal quality. Consistent with the theories reviewed 
earlier, when line managers judge that employees lack scope to improve their 
performance, perceived divisiveness increases, although the effect on incentive is 
barely statistically significant. 
 
The results also show that the lesser rewards from PRP associated with being on the 
top one’s pay scale diminish perceived incentive. In contrast, the positive interaction 
with length of service indicates that longer serving employees are conscious of the 
improvement compared with the previous age-incremental pay system when they 
would have had no scope for extra pay. 
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The control variables deserve comment. The lower down one’s occupation is in the 
organizational hierarchy, the stronger is the perceived incentive of PRP, but so also is 
perceived divisiveness. The exception is professionals, who appear to find PRP 
particularly divisive, possibly because they have long been accustomed to exercise 
considerable discretion in their work and so resent the extra management control that 
comes with performance management. Length of service and gender were introduced 
as additional demographic controls. Long service employees may be generally more 
resistant to change having invested more in the former pay systems, and this appears 
to be the case in Table 2, but the coefficients are small. One might expect men to be 
more responsive to individual performance rewards than women, but in this sample, 
the effects of gender appear to be weak or not statistically significant. 
 
Finally, the coefficient for the group PRP scheme hospital deserves comment. It 
shows that the group scheme was considerably less divisive than the individual PRP 
schemes used in the other organizations.
6
 This supports the evidence of Drago and 
Garvey (1998) that strong individual incentives may diminish helping behavior 
among colleagues if this gets in the way of individual targets. 
 
Thus, a first conclusion is that the performance pay and appraisal schemes were 
actively influencing employee motivation, and that they did so in the manner the main 
theories predict. 
Regression results 2: impact on appraised performance 
 
Table 3. Effects of perceived incentive and divisiveness on employee performance 
 
The second set of regression results, reported in Table 3, is based on Equation (3) 
above. The left-hand column shows the effect of perceived incentive and divisiveness 
on employee performance as measured by the latest appraisal score, and the right-
hand one includes also appraisal quality and reports the interactions among these 
variables. To compare across schemes, the performance variable had to be simplified 
into a binary one, whether or not the employee’s performance had been graded as 
‘superior’, so a logistic regression was used. The results show quite clearly that 
incentive and divisiveness affect individual performance. The effect of the first is 
positive and of the second is negative, and both are strongly statistically significant. 
As an approximate guide, given the crude nature of the Likert scales, one can say that 
a one standard deviation increase in perceived incentive would raise the probability of 
‘superior performance’ by about 0.6 and a similar increase in perceived divisiveness 
would reduce it by about 0.4.
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  The strong coefficient for appraisal quality deserves 
comment: it implies that a standard deviation increase in effectiveness of appraisal 
would lead roughly to a 0.7 increase in the probability of superior performance. The 
robustness of this coefficient, despite the inclusion of interaction terms, indicates that 
there is also a strong direct effect of appraisal on performance, in line with the 
renegotiation perspective. 
 
Appraisal and the re-negotiation of performance 
Because management has to renegotiate performance norms within a budget 
constraint, it is likely that the terms offered will be accepted voluntarily by some 
employees, but will find only involuntary compliance from others who do not feel 
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adequately compensated. This suggests there will be ‘two faces’ to appraisal. It can 
provide incentives by clarifying work goals and giving recognition, but it can also be 
a vehicle for management to pressurize employees into giving higher levels, or 
different kinds, of performance, for fear of losing pay or even losing their jobs. The 
CEP survey data for the tax service provide some evidence for this. In line with 
concerns raised by the department’s Review Team (Inland Revenue, 1994b), 
respondents were asked whether staff felt pressurized to accept management’s choice 
of objectives, as opposed to agreeing them voluntarily, despite the latter being the 
express philosophy of the service’s performance management scheme (Inland 
Revenue, 1995). They were asked whether they thought everyone was in effect given 
the same targets – despite the philosophy that targets should be adapted to the 
capabilities of individual employees, another concern of the Review Team. They were 
also asked about the negotiation of objectives: whether they thought those who were 
awarded superior appraisals did so because they were cleverer at negotiating their 
objectives; and whether, when agreeing their objectives, they were more concerned to 
avoid the risk of a bad appraisal than to aim for a superior performance rating. They 
were asked too about how they thought management operated the scheme, fairly or 
otherwise, captured by whether or not they thought management applied a quota on 
good appraisals, and whether they used the scheme to reward their favorites. 
 
The measures of appraisal quality, perceived incentive and divisiveness and the 
appraisal scores were regressed on the replies to these questions, using the same 
control variables as in Table 2. The results, available in Marsden (2003), paint a 
consistent picture in which staff feelings that management pressurized staff, and were 
not playing the game, undermined both motivation and faith in the appraisal process, 
and boosted perceptions of divisiveness. Staff feelings of pressure and management 
bad faith did not bear a statistically significant relationship with appraisal scores, so 
one can rule out the ‘sour grapes’ factor.8 
 
One group of employees was especially likely to report feelings of duress: part-timers, 
who are particularly numerous in the public sector. Being an objective characteristic, 
part-time status will not be influenced by the employees’ experience with their PRP 
scheme. Given that many staff become part-time in order to reconcile work and 
domestic responsibilities, they are particularly likely to be unhappy about the new 
trade-off between new work norms and reward and hence to renegotiate reluctantly. 
The replies show that they were twice as likely as full-time staff to report staff being 
pressurized to agree targets, and they were also more likely to express cynical views 
about the operation of appraisal. 
  
A final question is whether feelings of duress arise because some line managers are 
just bad at appraisal and goal setting, and so do it in a threatening way, in which case, 
better design and more training might be the answer. This was suggested in some of 
the internal management reviews in the tax service (e.g. Inland Revenue, 1997). 
Alternatively, it might be caused by the degree of pressure from the employer to raise 
performance, as part of a renegotiation of performance levels. To explore the causes 
of duress more fully, it is helpful to consider the respective roles of individual and 
collective bargaining (Table 4). 
 
One indication of the intensity of renegotiation at the individual level is the degree to 
which the new scheme is made compulsory for all employees. Thus, at the Inland 
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Revenue and the Employment Service, the schemes were universal and compulsory, 
and all employees had to agree work objectives and accept monitoring of their 
progress. In contrast, at the two hospitals, incumbent employees were offered a choice 
between their new scheme with higher basic pay and PRP, and remaining on the old 
nationally negotiated time-based pay scales without PRP. By doing this, management 
avoided conflict with some groups of employees, which were either hostile, or stood 
to lose accumulated premium payments they had under the old pay system. School 
head teachers came in an intermediate position because the implementation of 
performance pay at their schools depended on the initiative of school governors whom 
they could often influence. Finally, the scheme in force at the Inland Revenue in 1991 
was very much a hybrid between the old seniority-incremental system and the new 
performance management system. In the words of the union negotiators, it was 
‘bolted on’ to the old pay and appraisal system. Thus performance pay meant 
accelerated movement up the old incremental scale: there were carrots but no sticks. 
Thus, ranking the organizations on this measure of individual negotiation indicates 
that greater intensity is broadly associated with stronger perceptions of divisiveness. 
 
Collective bargaining has played a somewhat smaller role because it cannot do much 
more than set up a framework and establish incentives. The levering up of 
performance levels and the detailed reorientation of performance has to be done at the 
individual level between line managers and their staff. Nevertheless, the two 
collective agreements that ushered in performance pay at the Inland Revenue were 
conflictual. The 1988 agreement was obtained with a management threat that if PRP 
were not included, there would be no national agreement, and the 1993 agreement was 
preceded by a bitter strike despite early joint working parties on pay reform. The 
hospitals had the least conflictual introduction of performance pay as it came with 
new provisions for local bargaining. Thus, prima facie, it would seem that the 
pressure from management as expressed through the extent and intensity of individual 
negotiation partially accounts for the different levels of perceived divisiveness in the 
various organizations in this study (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Intensity of re-negotiation and perceived divisiveness 
 
Discussion of possible objections 
Before moving to conclusions, five possible objections to the renegotiation hypothesis 
need to be considered. 
a) Did appraisal scores influence reporting of appraisal quality, thus undermining 
a key statistical relationship for the renegotiation thesis? 
b) Did appraised performance represent actual performance, or just management 
leniency? 
c) Did performance improvements represent ‘working smarter rather than 
harder’, and hence require no renegotiation? 
d) Would not the elimination of widespread ‘shirking’ also explain resentment 
coupled with higher productivity? 
e) Would new recruits attracted by higher performance pay account for the rise in 
productivity whereas incumbent employees remained discontented? 
f) Was PRP a ‘lightning conductor’ for general discontent about work 
reorganization? 
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a) It is possible that employees’ performance appraisal scores may color their 
reporting of the quality of their appraisal process and the measures of perceived 
incentive and divisiveness. Although a recent study found that appraisal scores had 
little influence on perceptions of the appraisal process, this may depend on how it is 
operated in different organizations (Boswell and Boudreau, 2000). This was checked 
further in two ways. The first test used the richer descriptive data collected on the 
appraisal process in the CEP study’s two hospitals and show that they also correlated 
well with the measures of appraisal quality. The second used a two-stage least squares 
regression. This sought to predict, respectively, perceived incentive and perceived 
divisiveness from the appraisal quality variable shown in Table 2, and then, using the 
predicted values of incentive and divisiveness, to predict performance appraisal 
scores. These had the correct signs and were highly significant, and so confirm that 
even though there may be some perceptual bias caused by the employee’s appraisal 
score, it was not such as to undermine the model proposed here
9
. 
 
b) A second potential objection is that appraisal scores do not represent actual 
performance, productivity, so much as the leniency of line managers. There is 
considerable evidence from other studies (eg. Milkovich and Wigdor, 1991) that 
appraisal scores are prone to inflation as lenient managers use appraisals to buy peace 
and sort out other organizational problems. It is therefore necessary to check whether 
the measure of appraised performance in this study was sufficiently robust against 
such pressures. Three checks were made and are analyzed in detail in Marsden (2003). 
First, top management had the necessary procedures to monitor appraisals by line 
managers. Except in schools, where this was not feasible for head teachers, the 
schemes in this study involved mechanisms for the next higher level of management 
to ‘grand-parent’ appraisals by the line-managers for whom they were responsible. 
The distribution of appraisal scores was also monitored in line with anti-
discrimination legislation, and in several cases, such as the Inland Revenue, 
information on the distribution of scores was shared with the main trade unions. In 
several cases there were also appeal procedures. Finally, in the conduct of appraisals, 
considerable emphasis was put on agreeing written objectives, and appraising against 
these. Thus, although appraisal is necessarily judgmental, there were a number of 
checks on how that judgment was exercised. 
 
A second check by the author was to analyze the distribution of appraisal scores 
across administrative units in the Inland Revenue for which a good ten-year time 
series could be obtained, and to compare their evolution over time with that of the 
units’ operational performance targets published in its annual report and accounts. 
These included such indicators as the percentage of tax cases processed within a fixed 
deadline, and quality targets such as time of response and, latterly, percentage of work 
correct first time. What emerges is that top management used the targets it set for the 
administrative units in order to control the behavior of local line managers, and they 
managed to hold quality and output targets at a time when staff numbers were falling. 
This, coupled with the increasing sophistication of targets and increasing use of 
probability sampling procedures for their measurement, indicates a good degree of 
control by top management. 
 
Thirdly, productivity was increasing steadily through much of the period, measured 
by real tax revenue per employee and by the ratio of tax yield to cost of collection. 
Rising economic activity brings rising tax revenue per tax-payer, but it also increases 
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the number of tax transactions as more enter employment, and more varied sources of 
income and saving make tax files more complex. Part of the increased load may have 
been eased by new technology and by ‘Self-Assessment’ which shifted some 
obligations from the tax service onto tax-payers, but even these required considerable 
changes to staff work routines and methods, and throughout, the unions were drawing 
attention to the workload implications. 
 
c) Even though organizational performance improved, a number of other questions 
remain. One might ask whether this was simply the result of staff working ‘smarter’ 
rather than ‘harder’, with no need for renegotiation. To some extent, this is a 
misleading dichotomy because working ‘smarter’ may also require greater mental 
effort at one’s job, but let us give the benefit of doubt. A substantial minority of line 
managers, who have to appraise their colleagues’ performance, replied that PRP had 
caused many of the staff to worker harder (Table 1 above). This view was also echoed 
in an interview with one senior HR manager at the Inland Revenue. Indeed, he 
expressed precisely the opposite view: that people were working, in his words, ‘harder 
but not smarter’. This was so largely because, especially at junior levels, staff lacked 
the expertise and resources to design new work methods themselves.
10
  Increased 
work load is also reflected in the growth in the percentage of posts in the tax service 
classed as ‘extra loaded’, that is, with ‘objectives significantly more stretching than 
the average’ (Inland Revenue 1994a). It grew from about 8% of staff in 1993 until 
1996, when it leveled off at about 17-18% of staff. Thus, in the organization with the 
best data, the evidence points strongly to increased work load and mental effort 
accompanying PRP. 
 
d) If PRP had eliminated widespread ‘shirking’ among public servants, might not 
productivity rise along with employee resentment? This is not consistent with the 
levels of organizational commitment found, whereby the great majority of 
respondents (67%) felt a strong sense of commitment to their place of work
11
. There 
may have been a small minority of ‘shirkers’ but it does not seem large enough to 
explain the widespread disenchantment noted in this and the other studies. 
 
e) If we follow Lazear’s (1998) finding that improving incentives attracted more 
productive recruits, it might seem possible that productivity rose as a result of the new 
recruits whereas incumbent staff felt alienated. This is ruled out by the low levels of 
recruitment in the public services during the 1990s, and by the lack of influence of 
length of service in the regression analysis. 
 
f) Might PRP have acted simply as a ‘lightning conductor’ for the resulting discontent 
caused by other organizational changes? This might seem plausible had PRP shown 
no motivational effects, and had there been no link between appraisal quality and 
individual performance, but the statistical analysis showed that PRP was a central 
instrument in the renegotiation. 
 
Thus, all of these possible objections can be set aside. The solution to the paradox 
noted at the start is that PRP was as much a vehicle for renegotiating the effort 
bargain as it was for motivating employees to perform better. 
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Conclusion 
This article has argued that the main story behind the introduction of PRP across large 
sections of the British public services during the 1990s has been to facilitate the 
renegotiation of performance norms. When introducing a new incentive scheme with 
an established workforce, management is almost certain to encounter a wide spread of 
employee preferences and to encounter the problem of winners and losers. Thus even 
when a scheme is well-designed and managers are well-prepared to operate it, there 
will very frequently be a mix of employees who respond favorably, and agree to the 
new norms, and others who resent them, and consider themselves worse off. Whereas 
the former are positively motivated to improve or adapt their performance, the latter 
are not, and management hold them to the new performance norms by means of goal 
setting and appraisal. In this way, one can explain why successive governments and 
top managers have believed in the merits of PRP for the public services despite the 
evidence they were aware of that many employees saw little incentive and much 
divisiveness.  
 
To some extent, renegotiation has emerged as a latent rather than an explicitly stated 
goal of PRP in the British public services. When Marsden and Richardson asked 
senior managers at the Inland Revenue in 1991 about the goals of the PRP scheme 
they operated then, they explained it in terms of motivation. Likewise, the union 
representing Inland Revenue staff had invited them to carry out the survey hoping to 
demonstrate publicly what they knew from discussions with their members: that it 
was not motivating staff. The second Inland Revenue scheme, introduced in 1993, did 
not speak of renegotiation, but it did use the language of agreeing objectives and 
establishing a ‘contract’ with individual employees, and of relating these to the 
department’s operating plans. Nevertheless, the prevailing language of public policy 
debate, as noted in the introduction, remains that of motivation and incentive, and yet, 
the success of the schemes in helping public management to reshape public service 
performance lies in a different domain, that of negotiation. This is where contract 
theory, and some of the older industrial relations literature may prove helpful in 
understanding what is going on. Both stress that the rules and practices, which we 
observe in organizations, are outcomes of a negotiated order. Unions and their 
workplace representatives may be weaker now than in years past, but the labor market 
continues to confer sometimes considerable individual bargaining power to workers. 
Of course, a large organization can always face down an individual worker, no matter 
how skilled or talented, but few organizations can afford a gradual bleeding away of 
their skilled personnel. Thus one has to consider the initial position that management 
seeks to change by means of PRP as one that is the result of a negotiation, albeit an 
implicit one. This is not a medium onto which management can just impose an 
optimal design. Rather, it has to negotiate its way there, and so in doing, respect the 
various budgetary and efficiency constraints it must satisfy to meet its own objectives. 
 
In his JEL review of work on incentives, Prendergast (1999) commented on the need 
to extend the study of incentives beyond CEOs, sales and sports personnel. Such 
personnel often have short job tenures, and the high rate of labor turnover means that 
self-selection often brings about a match between employee preferences and the type 
of incentive offered by the organization. The British public service has highlighted the 
opposite problem whereby high labor stability, especially during the early to mid-
1990s, meant that employers had to obtain results from new incentive schemes when 
implementing them for a large incumbent workforce. Many of these people may be 
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critical, if not of the principle, then of the new management practices and methods of 
work associated with them. A difficult decision for management is where to draw the 
divide between those who support and those who oppose a new incentive scheme, and 
whether to go for administrative simplicity by applying the same scheme to all 
employees, or to allow a degree of choice. 
 
Finally, the public service experience of renegotiation has highlighted the key role of 
line managers. They are essential to the renegotiation process because they are the 
link between top management’s goals, and the way ordinary staff carry out their jobs. 
This introduces another layer in the principal-agent analysis of incentives. Their 
abilities and interests are not identical to those of top management, and they have no 
protective gatekeepers controlling staff access to them. When agreeing to performance 
objectives with individual staff, the pressures on them to be lenient are great. What 
seems to have kept these mostly at bay has been the articulation between performance 
objectives at different levels within the public organizations. This has provided 
support to line managers, and given them the means to keep a focus on broader 
organizational performance when establishing individual objectives.  It has not always 
worked. At the Employment Service, shortly after the CEP survey, the controls did 
break down, and managers and staff appeared to collude in over-reporting of job 
placements by some local offices (Marsden and French, 1998). In contrast, the 
internal auditing controls in the tax service, which the author followed over several 
years from the published accounts, show use of increasingly sophisticated 
procedures
12
. Indeed, after the misreporting incident, the Employment Service 
changed its methods of internal auditing, an indication that it took its internal 
performance indicators seriously. The importance of this intervening level of 
performance management should not be underestimated. In a famous case in the 
British automobile industry, lack of attention to this level transformed top 
management’s much heralded ‘Measured Daywork’ scheme into what its workforce 
nicknamed ‘Leisure Daywork’, and productivity collapsed. The British public services 
appear by and large to have avoided this by attention to the agents of renegotiation, 
line managers. 
 
Endnotes
                                                 
1
. I wish to acknowledge the helpful advice and comments from the editor and the anonymous referees, 
and workshop participants at the Centre for Economic Performance, the Society for the Advancement 
of Socio-Economics, and at the University of Grenoble. I also wish to thank the numerous managers, 
union officials and staff of the various public organizations for their time and help with the study. 
 
  
2
 Lazear (1998) attributes a good deal of the increased productivity associated with output-based pay to 
such self-selection processes, as more productive employees are attracted by the higher earnings 
opportunities offered by incentive pay. 
 
3
. Strictly speaking, their evidence relates to promotion. 
  
4
. It was 90% in the Inland Revenue, 60% in the Employment Service middle management grades 
studied, and around 90% among head teachers. Public hospitals are also highly unionised. 
  
5
 . A detailed analysis of these checks can be found in Marsden (2003). 
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6
. The individual trust hospital was not included in the regression because the pay system did not 
operate scale maxima and so absence of that variable excluded data from that hospital. 
 
7
 . The standard deviation of both perceived incentive and perceived divisiveness is 1.0. The logistic 
regressions estimates the change in the log of the odds of achieving superior performance associated 
with a unit change in a given independent variable, that is log(p/(1-p)), where p is the probability of the 
event, i.e. achieving superior performance. With a standard deviation of 1 for both motivation 
variables, p = e exp(b)/(1+ e exp(b)) where b is the regression coefficient. 
 
8
 The one exception was seeking objectives to avoid a bad appraisal which was negatively related to the 
person’s appraisal score. 
 
9
 The results are reported in Marsden (2003), and are available from the author. 
 
10
 . To make his point, he gave an interesting example. Under the new system, staff telephone work 
played an important in keeping close to the ‘customer’, yet many staff saw this as ‘queue jumping’ and 
as slowing down their work. In one case, the staff set up a team to answer the phone and bank up 
enquiries, but this then distanced them from the ‘customer’ and slowed down response times. Thus 
local staff initiative at working smarter to meet their output targets undermined their management’s 
goal of a more customer-centred service. 
 
11
. The correlation between responses to this question and the constructed measure of commitment used 
in Table 2 was 0.736 significant at the 1% level. 
 
12
 . For an analysis of these, see Marsden (2003). The Inland Revenue annual report and accounts are 
published as Parliamentary Papers by the Stationery Office, London. 
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Tables and Charts 
 
Table 1. Replies to employee attitude surveys in selected public service 
organizations. 
 Civil Service 
 
NHS trust 
hospitals 
Schools 
 
Question: % in each cell replying 
‘agree’ or ‘agree strongly’ 
Inland 
Revenue
1991 
Inland 
Revenue 
1996 
Employ
ment 
Service 
Individu
al PRP 
trust 
Group 
PRP 
trust 
Primary 
(NAHT) 
Seconda
ry 
(SHA) 
Pay and work orientations        
PP a good principle 57 58 72 62 52 29 42 
Motivation: perceived incentive        
PP gives me an incentive to work 
beyond job requirements 
21 18 12 32 22 8 10 
PP gives me an incentive to show 
more initiative in my job 
27 20 20 36 19 9 11 
PP means good work is rewarded 
at last 
41 19 24 47 34 38 40 
Motivation: perceived 
divisiveness 
       
PP causes jealousies 62 86 78 61 51 58 70 
PP makes staff less willing to 
assist colleagues 
28 63 52 22 19 51 54 
PP has made me less willing to 
cooperate with management 
10 30 26 19 14 7 4 
Relations with management: 
non-manager replies: 
       
Management use PP to reward 
their favorites  
35 57 41 41 27 Na na 
There is a quota on good 
assessments* 
74 78 74 57 36 48 45 
Line manager replies:        
PP has reduced staff willingness 
to cooperate with management 
20 45 39 30 27 Na na 
PP has increased the quantity of 
work done 
22 42 28 52 34 Na na 
N (total replies) 2,420 1,180 290 680 900 1,050 860 
Response rate (%) 61 30 33 28 21 51 21 
Note: based on five-point Likert scales: ‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘no view’, ‘agree’ and ‘agree 
strongly’. NAHT: National Association of Head Teachers (mainly primary schools); SHA: Secondary 
Heads Association (mainly secondary schools). For an explanation of the nature of the surveys, see the 
methods appendix. 
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Table 2. Determinants of perceived incentive and divisiveness (individual 
employees) 
(OLS regression: Dependent variables: perceived incentive and divisiveness) 
 
Dependent 
variable → 
Perceived 
incentive 
  Perceived 
divisiveness 
  
 Independent 
variables 
 
Unstand-
ardized 
Coefficients 
  Standardized 
Coefficients 
Unstand-
ardized 
Coefficients 
  Standardized 
Coefficients 
  B SE Beta B SE Beta 
Operation of PRP 
schemes 
      
Appraisal quality .195** .020 .175** -.213** .019 -.194** 
Mgrs set targets 
more clearly 
.263** .018 .250** -.042** .017 -.041** 
No scope to raise 
performance§ 
.124+ .085 .030+ .221** .080 .055** 
Financial incentive       
Max on pay scale -.204** .064 -.098** .001 .060 .000 
Interaction: length 
of service*pay_max 
.011* .005 .099* -.001 .005 -.014 
Commitment       
Affective 
commitment  
.173** .020 .153** -.183** .019 -.165** 
Goal commitment  .153** .022 .131** .030 .021 .026 
Organizational 
controls 
      
Inland Revenue 96  -.022 .052 -.010 .577** .049 .252** 
Employment 
Service  
-.189+ .120 -.029+ .396** .113 .062** 
Group trust hospital -.085 .116 -.024 -.706** .110 -.202** 
Occupational and 
demographic 
controls 
      
Professionals -.159 .153 -.034 .421** .144 .091** 
Technicians .165* .079 .060* .185** .074 .068** 
Clerical .311** .074 .140** .262** .070 .120** 
Service employees  .475** .193 .057** .357* .182 .043* 
Craft dummy .357 .703 .009 1.020+ .663 .026+ 
Length of Service -.016** .004 -.130** .014** .004 .115** 
Male (dummy) -.080* .040 -.037* .050 .037 .023 
       
(Constant) -.978** .282  -1.039** .266  
       
Adjusted r2   0.203   0.264 
Significance   0.000   0.000 
N   2752   2752 
Significance levels: ** 2%; * 5%; + 15%. 
Sample: non-managers in workplaces with sample observations >19 employees. 
Notes: § Based on line manager judgments that staff in their office have no scope to improve their 
performance. Note that analysis excludes line managers in order to use their judgments of employees’ 
scope to change their performance in their office. 
Results shown exclude head teachers, but their inclusion does not alter the main results, except for the 
occupational control variables. 
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Table 3. Effects of perceived incentive, divisiveness and appraisal quality on 
employee performance:  
(Logit regression: Dependent variable: probability of achieving ‘superior’ 
performance.) 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 B S.E. B S.E. 
Incentives and commitment     
Perceived incentive  .372** .040 .273* .135 
Percieved divisiveness  -.273** 0.45 -.275* .136 
Operation of appraisal and target setting     
Appraisal quality   .996** .065 
Targets set more clearly   -.149** .050 
No scope to raise performance§   -.985** .219 
Commitment     
Affective commitment    -.075# .055 
Goal commitment   -.282** .056 
Interactions     
Incentive*appraisal quality   .051 .057 
Divisiveness*appraisal quality   -.143** .056 
Incentive*targets   .015 .044 
Divisiveness*targets   .062# .048 
Incentive*divisiveness    .000 .048 
     
Occupational and demographic controls     
Professionals -1.878** .285 -1.638** .325 
Technicians .302+ .182 .299# .197 
Clerical .198 .169 .306+ .184 
Service employees -6.968+ 3.871 -6.596# 4.262 
Craft -1.1181 .935 -1.922# 1.508 
Length of service .021** .005 .026** .006 
Male (dummy) .009 .092 -.155# .102 
     
Organizational controls     
Inland Revenue 96 -.259** .101 .792** .131 
Employment Service -2.547** .569 -2.242** .594 
NHS trust hospitals .509** .215 .826** .249 
     
Constant -.883** .198 2.038** .722 
R2 (Cox & Snell) .125  0.226  
R2 (Nagelkerke) .171  0.308  
% correctly predicted 65.6  72.0  
N 2991  2819  
Note: superior performance includes ‘exceed’ and ‘succeed at extra-loaded’ jobs. 
§ Based on line manager judgment that staff in their office have no scope to improve their performance. 
** 2%; * 5%; + 10%; # 20%. 
Results shown exclude head teachers, but their inclusion does not alter the main results, except for the 
occupational control variables. 
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Table 4. Intensity of re-negotiation and perceived divisiveness 
  
  
Divisiveness: 
Standardized 
Mean 
Standard 
error 
Role of individual 
agreement on PRP 
Role of collective agreement 
Inland Revenue 
1996 
0.472 .035 Compulsory for all 1993 pay agreement after strike 
Employment 
Service 
0.252 .061 Compulsory for all 
Series of agreements for different 
staff grades 1994-95 
Schools: Head 
teachers 
0.142 .060 
Compulsory if 
adopted by school 
governors 
Implemented by government 
after pay review as one criterion 
for pay awards by school 
governors 
Hospital with 
individual PRP 
-0.041 .066 
Voluntary for 
current staff 
Implemented by local mgt; 
subsequent agreement with 
unions 
Inland Revenue 
1991 
-0.158 .067 
Compulsory but no 
losers 
1988 pay agreement 
Hospital with 
trust-wide bonus 
-0.486 .067 
Voluntary for 
current staff 
Implemented by local mgt; 
subsequent agreement with 
unions 
Note: mean perceived divisiveness for all organizations combined is 0, with a standard deviation of 1, 
and a mean for each organization of between 0.9 and 1. 
The standardized means are derived using the organizational dummies and constant term as in Table 2, 
but excluding the questions on scope to raise performance, and on the maximum pay for the grade 
because these were not asked for head teachers and staff in the individual PRP hospital. This makes no 
difference to the rank order of divisiveness by organization, nor does using the raw mean calculated 
directly from the sample. 
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Methods appendix 
 
Details of schemes, the employee attitude surveys, and derivation of key 
variables. 
 
Table A 1 Summary details of performance pay schemes studied. 
 
Organization Type of scheme Treatment of employees 
at the top of their 
respective pay span 
Per cent of 
employees on 
their pay span 
maximum 
Inland 
Revenue 1991 
Employees move up existing 
seniority pay scale faster on receipt 
of good appraisal by line manager. 
Appraisal against standardised 
criteria. 
Smaller % merit 
increases for higher level 
grades and limit of 3 
increments above span 
max for merit payments. 
69% 
Inland 
Revenue 1996 
No seniority scales. Appraised as 
‘Succeeding’ at agreed targets brings 
pay increase, and ‘Exceeding’ brings 
additional increase, as does 
‘Succeeding’ at jobs classified ‘extra 
loaded’. No cost of living increase in 
some years. 
Smaller % merit 
payments as staff 
progress up the pay span 
for their grade, and 
restrictions on 
overlapping with grade 
above 
51% 
Employment 
Service 
No seniority scales. Pay increase 
depends on achieving appraised 
performance objectives & is based 
on a share of a union-negotiated pot. 
Performance pay above 
the maximum for the 
grade is non-
consolidated 
59% 
NHS hospital 
– individual 
PRP 
No seniority scale. Pay increase 
dependent on appraised individual 
performance. 
No scale max but bonus 
for above average 
performance is non-
consolidated 
Not applicable 
NHS hospital 
– trust-wide 
bonus 
No seniority scale. Pay increase 
depends on trust-wide bonus, poor 
performers only excluded. 
Bonus at the grade 
maximum becomes 
entirely non-consolidated 
27% of those on 
PRP; 80% of 
those remaining 
on the former 
pay system.  
School head 
teachers 
Additional movement up pay spine 
for appraised excellent performance 
by school governors. No seniority 
increments 
No limit on additional 
spine points that may be 
awarded 
Not applicable 
Full details of the schemes are available in Marsden and French (1998) available 
online at www.cep.lse.ac.uk, or from the author. 
 
All of the schemes had been in operation for about three years before they were 
surveyed so that many initial teething problems should have been overcome. 
Management made the initial decision on the design and implementation, and only 
subsequently were the unions involved. 
 
The performance appraisal systems used, especially after the first of the tax service 
studies, drew heavily on the experience of outside consultants. The systems used in 
the two hospitals were the Lloyd Masters and Mediquate systems that are quite widely 
used in the health sector. The scheme in the tax service that was in operation in 1996 
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had a substantial input from private consultants, and incorporated many ‘best practice’ 
ideas from the private sector and from the HR profession generally. Indeed, even the 
scheme in operation at the time of the 1991 survey met many of the criteria for good 
appraisal set out by the government’s Arbitration, Conciliation and Advisory Service, 
(ACAS, 1990). Through the 1980s and 1990s, the public sector made extensive use of 
private sector consultancy organizations. The schemes contained a number of checks 
and balances, notably, all line-manager appraisals were vetted by a higher level 
manager (except for head teachers). The overall distribution of appraisal scores was 
also made available to the unions, and was monitored by management to ensure the 
schemes were operated without bias and to protect them against an upward drift in 
performance ratings. Measures of internal performance were also checked by the 
Audit Office, which has overall responsibility for monitoring the quality of public 
spending. All of these help ensure the reliability of individual performance ratings.  
 
The attitudinal data were collected by postal questionnaire sent to individual 
employees in each organization. Mostly these were completed in the employee’s own 
time. In three organizations, management cooperated with the study, enabling lists of 
employees to be used for drawing the sample, and the internal mail for distributing 
and receiving back questionnaires. Lacking management support for the 1996-97 
surveys of the civil service departments and for schools, union membership lists were 
used, but membership density is very high. It was about 90% in the Inland Revenue 
grades covered, about 60% for the relevant grades in the Employment Service, and 
about 90% among head teachers. In the hospitals, all staff were included except 
medical doctors who were outside the PRP scheme. 
 
The staff grades covered were the following. In the Inland Revenue all grades were 
included except higher management and most clerical grades, which were represented 
by other unions and covered by different PRP schemes. In the Employment Service, 
those covered were mostly in middle management grades. In schools, head teachers 
were covered, there being no PRP at the time for classroom teachers. 
 
Most of the attitudinal questions used 5-point Likert scales, ranging from ‘disagree 
strongly’ to ‘agree strongly’. Questions were piloted with groups of employees and 
where management cooperation was lacking, with groups of union members. 
Preliminary results were presented to the organizations and interpretations discussed 
with management and unions in feedback seminars. 
 
The questionnaires were divided into sections. Each dealt with a specific aspect: 
general attitudes to pay and performance; employee judgments of whether or not it 
gave them an incentive, their personal experience with their most recent performance 
appraisal; and line-managers’ views of the effects of the scheme on staff. The full text 
of the questionnaires can be found in Marsden and Richardson (1992) and Marsden 
and French (1998). 
 
The survey response rate was 43% overall, but the questionnaire was long, over 100 
questions. Details by organization are given in the main text (Table 1). Response 
patterns were compared with such demographic and other breakdowns as were 
available. Response rates were higher among the more managerial occupations, but all 
occupational levels were well represented in the sample. Response by gender and by 
age or length of service, and where asked, by ethnic background, and full- and part-
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time showed no great divergence from the organizations’ employment figures. There 
was also a good response from across the regional offices of the tax and the 
employment services. Response patterns were compared with appraisal markings and 
found to be very similar across performance ratings. 
 
